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ABS TRACT
The primary purpose of this paper is to reconcile the previous findings
of discount rate endogeneity with the presence of discount rate announcement
effects in securities markets. The crux of this reconciliation is the
dictinctirm htwen "trhnira1" dicrriintrtchnac that ndnanrwc and ..j
'non—technical"changes which contain some informative policy implications.
In essence, we attempt to separate expected discount rate changes from
unexpected changes, or equivalently, the expected component of discount rate
changes from the unexpected component. If markets are efficient, the former
should have no announcement effects while the latter may be associated with an
announcement effect. Accordingly, the focus of the empirical analysis is on
the interaction between discount rate exogeneity, the specific monetary policy
regime, and announcement effects. In addition, we examine whether the behavior
of these markets in the post-announcement period is consistent with the rapid
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(314) 889-6340Considerable empirical evidence has been presented (e.g., Waud (1970)) to
support the assertion that discount rate changes contain "announcement
effects" concerning the future course of monetary policy which significantly
affect security prices.1 Roley and Troll (1984) contend that the validity of
this assertion depends on the operating procedures employed by the monetary
authorities, Specifically, they present an analytical framework which
demonstrates that with a policy of interest rate targeting, which
characterized open market operating procedures prior to October 1979 (pre—79),
no meaningful announcement effects are possible since any effects on nrket
rates would be offset by changes in the level of nonborrowed reserves. Under
nonborrowed reserve targeting, which has characterized post-October 1979
(post—79) monetary policy, changes in discount rates affect interest rates
directly via (at least) changes in the expected short-run money path.
Consistent with this view, Roley and Troll report no nnonco ffe&-c
fromdiscount rate changes on the term structure of interest rates from
September 1977 to October 1979, but a significant announcement effect over the
October 1979 to October 1982 period characterized by increases (decreases) in
bond yields being associated with discount rate increases (decreases). Pearce
and Roley (1984) report similar results for stock returns over the identical
time period. Specifically, they find no announcement effect in the pre—
October 1979 period, but significant negative (positive) stock returns
associated with the announcement of discount rate increases (decreases) in the
later period.
One difficulty with these studies is the assertion that discount rate
changes are unexpected; that is, discount rate changes are exogenous. This is
in contrast to both Lombra and Torto (1977) and Froyen (1975) who present
evidence that the discount rates is a function of open market interest rates2
and member bank borrowing. Santomero (1983) and the papers cited therein
describe current discount rate policy as passive and responding with a lag to
changes in open market rates. The evidence from these studies suggest that
discount rate changes are endogenous, and that even if these changes coincide
with a recent revision in monetary policy objectives, the policy revision
would already be incorporated into market yields. There would be no
announcement effect under either operating procedure, since no new information
is provided by the announcement.
The presence of an announcement effect associated with an endogenous
(anticipated) discount rate change suggests that securities markets may not be
(semi—strong) efficient. Such a finding would be in stark contrast to the
numerous studies that either assume market efficiency for the purpose of
hypothesis testing or provide empirical evidence in support of market
efficiency.2 Further, the usefulness of the discount rate as a monetary
policy instrument is questionable if endogenous changes generate announcement
effects.
The primary purpose of this paper is to reconcile the previous findings
of discount rate endogerieity with the presence of discount rate announcement
effects in securities markets. The crux of this reconciliation is the
distinction between "technical" discount rate changes that are endogenous and
"non—technical" changes which contain some informative policy implications.
In essence, we attempt to separate expected discount rate changes from
unexpected changes, or equivalently, the expected component of discount rate
changes from the unexpected component. If markets are efficient, the former
should have no announcement effects while the latter may be associated with an
announcement effect.3 Accordingly, the focus of the empirical analysis is on
the interaction between discount rate exogeneity, the specific monetary policy3
regime, and announcement effects. In addition, we examine whether the
behavior of these markets in the post—announcement periodisconsistent with
the rapid price adjustment implied by market efficiency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II presents
a brief discussion of the theoretical link between discount rate changes and
market returns as well as a description of the data and methodology.
Preliminary tests reported in this section using our longer sample period
confirm the Roley and Troll and Pearce and Roley findings: a significant
announcement effect characterizes the post-79 period but there is no reaction
of securities markets to discount rate changes in the pre—79 period. The next
two sectionsrefinethe analysis to distinguish between technical and
nontechnical discount rate changes. Section III provides a description of the
classification scheme that we employ to identify technical and nontechnical
aiscounc race changes. Section IV extends Ute empirical tests of ectin II
using this classification. We find that in the pre—79 period there was no
securities markets response to either technical or nontechnical changes while
in the post79 period there was no response to technical changes. Only
nontechnical changes occurring in the post—79 period were characterized by
significant announcement effects. In Section V we test and find that there is
some evidence of a significant price adjustment in the day immediately
following the actual announcement, but no price adjustment beyond this first
day. Section VI contains our summary and conclusions.
II. Theoretical Framework and Preliminary Results
Discount rate changes will affect market rates and equity returns if such
changes convey new information about either short or long-run monetary policy
objectives. Roley and Troll argue that an increase in the discount rate that
changes the implied short-run money path would be associated with an objective4
of returning to an implied long-run money growth path more quickly. As a
result, current (spot) and expected short—term rates rise in reaction to
reduced short-run money growth. Long—term rates and forward rates may also
increase to reflect the higher expected short-term rates. The opposite effect
on interest rates is expected for discount rate decreases. An increasein the
discount rate that changes only long—run monetary policy objectives would be
associated with a decline in long-run trend money growth, reducing expected
inflation and lowering future expected short-term rates. This implies no
changein current short—term rates and a decline in long-term rates and
forward rates. The opposite is expected for discount rate declines. If the
perception of both short andlong-run policy objectives is changed, a discount
rate increase (decrease) may beexpected to be associated with an increase in
short—termrates but an ambiguous effect on forward rates and long—term
rts. ly nd Tr1l find increases (decreases) in the thonnt ratersiiTt
in increases (decreases) in short—term and long—term rates, leading them to
conclude that the observed announcement effect is associated with changes in
short—run monetary policy objectives.
The impact of discount rate changes on equity prices can operate through
two possible channels. This is most readily seen by viewing the value of the
firm as the present value of its future net cash flows. To the extent
discount rate increases (decreases) result in increases (decreases) in
interest rates, the rate at which the firm's cash flows are capitalized will
rise (fall) with a subsequent negative (positive) effect on stock prices.
Additionally, discount rate changes can alter expectations of future cash
flows.Specifically, discount rate changes that increase or decrease real
economic activity will alter cash flow expectations in the same direction.
One would expect that to the extent both capitalization rates and cash flow5
expectations are affected by discount rate changes, these effects will work in
the same direction.4 Given the Roley and Troll findings discussed above, we
expect stock price declines to be associated with discount rate increases, a
finding that would be in agreement with the results reported by Pearce and
Roley.
To assess the impact of discount rate changes on interest rates and stock
prices, we utilize an event-time methodology that is similar to that employed
by Roley and Troll in their paper and by Urich and Wachtel (1981), Roley
(1983) and Pearce and Roley (1983) in their studIes of financial market
reaction to moneysupplychanges. The following model is estimated
(1)
where R1t is the percentage change in the relevant interest rate or in stock
prices observed on announcement day t of a discount rate change and is
measured from the close of day t -1to the close of day t. ARDt is the
percentage change in the discount rate announced on day t, For the purposes
of this study, the announcement day is the day the discount rate change was
reported in the Wall Street Journal. Our tests for differences in financial
market reaction according to technical or nontechnical classification, as well
as the investigation of financial market speed of adjustment issue use
variants of (1) that are described in the following sections.
The time period for this study is the eight year period from 1975 —1982
(no discount rate changes in 1983). Over this period there were 36 discount
rate changes, 18 of which occurred prior to October 1979. Twenty—three of
these changes were increases and 13 were decreases. Table 1 provides a
reakdown of the discount rate change data based on the size of the change and
the period in which it occurred. The data indicate a clear shift toward6
larger absolute changes in the post—79 period as the average change increased
from 43to82 basis points.
Thestock return data is the daily percentage return on the New York
Stock Exchange value weighted index and isdenoted SP. The interest rate data
are for constant maturity Treasury securities and include eight different
maturities: 90, 180 and 360 day bills and three, five, seven, ten and twenty
year bonds. These rates are obtained from DRI, who compile them from the
Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release H.15. These eight interest rates
are used to calculate seven forward ratesin addition to the90 day bill
rate.Usingforward rates avoids confounding the effect of discount rate
changeson short—termrates with the effect on long—term rates, since
movementsin short—term rates will be reflected in movements in long-term
rates, andallowsmore direct assessment of the effect of discount rate
changcs on the tern structure •Thccforward ratos aro donotod r and are xy
read as the interest rate x periods hence on a security withmaturity y.
Finally, it hasbeen shown (e.g., Yawitz (1977))that under quite reasonable
theoretical specifications the risk and maturity structure of interest rates
is better modelled in terms of the so-called discount factor, which is simply
one plus the rate of interest. Accordingly, the percentge changes in both the
interest rate and discount rate series are calculated as the percentage change
in one plus the interest rate.5
As an initial test, we estimate equation (1) over the pre—79 and post—79
periods for each of nine return series.6 The estimates of the market response
coefficientare reported in Table 2. Our results confirm the Roley and
Troll and Pearce and Roley findings. For the equity series, there is no
significant market response in the pre—79 period but over the post—79 period
there is a significant negative (positive) response to discount rate increases7
(decreases).The magnitude of the response coefficient suggests that a 100
basis point change in the discount rate results in approximately a one percent
change in stock prices on the announcement day, almost identical to the
magnitude reported by Pearce and Roley.
A similar finding is reported for the interest rate data. Only one
interest rate series evidences a significant market reaction in the pre—79
period, while six of the eight interest rates indicate a significant market
response over the post-79 period.7 The pattern of coefficients suggests a
larger effect on short—term rates than on forward rates with a positive
response on each rate. This finding supports the view that discount rate
changes affect expectations about short—run monetary policy objectives.
Finally, the magnitude of the response coefficients mirror that of Roley and
Trolland suggest, for example, that a 100 basis point increase in the
diruntrM-will increasethe 90 T—Bill rate and ,0r.0 by approximately 50
and 18 basis points, respectively.8
Although the above results confirm earlier findings, therealissue is
whetherthe observed announcement effect, regardless of the monetary policy
regime, indicates a market inefficiency. If, as available evidence indicates,
the discount rate is endogenous, then the market may be inefficient since it
significantly reacts to an event that should contain no new information. The
hypothesis of this paper is that not all discount rate changes are entirely
endogenousand those that are not may provide securities markets with new
information that will lead to an adjustmentin prices. Financial markets will
beconsidered inefficient only iftechnical discount rate changes are
characterizedby announcement effects.8
iii.Classification of Discount Rate Changes
The previous discussion clearly indicates that to properly assessthe
announcementeffects of discount rate changes it is necessary to distinguish
technical from nontechnical changes. Roley and Troll recognizethis and
attempt to explain daily discount rate changes via a regressionequation,
relatingsuch changes to changes in the Fed Funds rate •Dueto the low
explanatory power of the equation, they are led toconclude that the entire
change in the discountrate is unexpected; that is, all discount rate changes
are nontechnical.9 This finding is also used by Pearceand Roley to justify
theirassumption of discount rate exogeneity.
There are several shortcomings with this approach, however, thatlimit
its usefulness in predicting discount rate changes and cast substantialdoubt
on the assumption of discount rate exogeneity. First,the current method of
ch.ancTinathediscount rate requires the approval of the Executive Committee of
the Federal Reserve Banks board of directors, which are contacted by phone
every two weeks. Accordingly, the discount rate canonly be changed at most
one day every two weeks. This implies a daily model ofdiscount rate changes
is,in some sense, attempting to capture a biweekly event sothat such a model
is unlikely to yield good forecasts. A second shortcoming is the tenuous
nature of constructing any reduced form model, This is particularly important
in modelling discount rate changes where there are nonquantifiable factors,
such as public statements by Federal Reserve officials, that may affect
expectations concerning discount rate changes. Third, given thediscrete
natureof discount rate changes and the volatility of the Fed Funds rate,it
isalso not surprising that both theexplanatory and predictive power of such
anequation is low. Indeed, despite the infrequent changes inthe discount
rate, the extent of Fed Funds variability suggests that non—zero predictions9
ofdiscount rate change are present for every day. Finally, as suggested by
points one and three, theinabilityto forecast the precise day of a discount
rate change, as such models attempt to do, does not necessarily mean that
changes in the discount rate are mostly unexpected, but only that their exact
timing cannot be predicted.
Given the above, we rely on two different methods to classify discount
rate changes. The first is a statistical model that attempts to avoid or at
least mitigate the shortcomings of the Roley and Troll discount rate change
model.In our approach, we use weekly and not daily data, since the former is
more consistent with Federal Reserve operating procedures. If the model
specification is RD = f(.), then the anticipated or technical component of an
actual discount rate change is f(.) and the unanticipated or nontechnical
component is ,RD —f(.),which is simply the error term from the xwdel. To
1-hrrcts to daily forecasts we assume that a discount rate
change predicted in week t is anticipated regardless of the day in week t it
is actually announced and an unanticipated discount rate change in week t is a
surprise regardless of the day it is announced.
Several different specifications were estimated, including variants of
those used by Roley and Troll, Lombra and Torto and by Brown (1981). One
notable finding is the rejection of model stability over the pre-79 arid post-
79periods. In all cases, the mean square error was at least twice as large
in thelatter period. The best model, bothin terms of in—sample fit and
predicting actual discount rate changes, related changes in the discount rate
(measuredin basis points) to the spread between the Fed Funds rate and the
discount rate (denoted SPREAD) over the last four weeks and changes in member
bank borrowing, calculated for week tasthechangeinborrowingfrom week t—1
to t (denoted BORRGW), over the last four weeks. The results of this model10
estimation are reported in Table 3.Althoughstill low, the explanatory power
representsa substantial improvement over Roley and Troll. Given the discrete
nature of discount rate changes it is not surprising that the magnitude of
actual discount rate changes is always underpredicted. Nonetheless, if the
model incorporates the relevant information set, then by construction the
forecasts are optimal predictions based on available information and,
therefore, rational.
The second method for classifying discount rate changes is much simpler
and more straightforward. When the Federal Reserve Board changes the discount
rate, it states the reason for its action in a press release at the time of
the discount rate change. For the purpose of this paper, technical changes
are those purportedly taken entirely to bring the discount rate in closer
alignmentwith money market rates. All other changes, even ifthey are
cjescrihd by the pre rdominant1v for technical reasons, are
classified as nontechnical.
Two pointsaboutthis second method&ogy and its implications need to be
made.First, it implicitly assumes the reasonsgiven by the Fed are accurate
orat least that the market perceives that they are accurate. As a check, the
interpretation presented in theWall Street Journal, which may more accurately
reflect the market's perceptions, was also examined. For the time period
1971—1980, only one discrepancy was found. Therefore, use of the press
releases for classification seems appropriate.0
Second, many of the changes classified as nontechnical also are at least
partiallytechnical in nature according tothe press releases. For example,
therationale given for the discount rate change on September 22, 1978 was"to
bring[the] discount rate in closer alignment with short-term interest rates,
andas a further step to strengthen the dollar." This clearly contains both11
technicaland nontechnical elements. Accordingly, one possible explanation
for the endogeneity—announcement effect anomaly is that the endogeneity
finding reflects technical changes and the technical elements of nontechnical
changes, while the nontechnical changes are responsible for the observed
announcement effect. Our criteria for a discount rate change to be classified
as technical has the effect of biasing against a finding that nontechnical
changes exert a stronger effect on financial markets.
These two technologies for classifying discount rate changes are distinct
in that the statistical method explicitly divides every discount rate change
into a technical and a nontechnical component, whereas our specification of
theuFederalReserve announcement (FRA) classification method" classifies the
entirechange as either technical or nontechnical. Since discount rate
changes generally consist of both technical and nontechnical components, itis
temptingtoassertthe superiority of the statistical methr. (iventhe
difficultiesin modelling discussed above, however, the Federal Reserve
announcement classification method may provide a more accurate decomposition
of discount rate changes. It is an empirical question as to which is the
superior approach.
Despite the differences in determining technical and nontechnical
composition, if both classification schemes reflect market expectations then
there should be some degreeof consistency across the models. That is, ifthe
statistical method indicates that a large percentage of a discount rate change
is unanticipated (anticipated) then we would expect the FRA method to classify
the change as nontechnical (technical). If thisis true, the correlation
coefficients between the percentage of a discount rate change classified as
technicalunder one method with the percentage of a discount rate change
classified as nontechnical under the alternative method should be negative,12
while the correlation coefficients of like classifications betweenmethods
should be positive. This is, in fact, the case. The formercorrelation
coefficients are —.442 and the latter are.442.12
IV. Empirical Results
Of the 18 pre—79 discount rate changes, 11 are classified as
nontechnical, while of the 18 post—79 discount rate changes, 12 areclassified
as nontechnical.13 To begin the analysis, equation (1)is respecified to




= +ARDT + ARD*NT + u' . (2b)
it T ttNT t t t
In (2a), RDT (RDNT) is that amount of a given discount rate changethat is
classified as technical (nontechnical) according to the statisticalmodel. In
(2b) T(NT) is a dummy variable equal to one if the discount rate changeis
classified as technical (nontechnical) according to the FRAC method and zero
otherwise. All other variables in (2a) and (2b) are as previously defined.
Our expectations about the coefficient T and in the pre- and post-79
periods form directly from the monetary policy regime andmarket efficiency
propositions stated earlier. Under the pre—79 interest rate targetingregime,
we expect =NT
=o since,regardless of classification, a discount rate
change is not required, and will not by itself change thelevel of market
interest rates. Given the results reported in Table 2, for the post—79 period
we expect T =0for both interest rates and equity prices and NT > 0 for
interest rates and < 0 for the equity return series. The expectations
of and are the same as for and NT' respectively.13
Theresults of estimating equations (2) for the two subperiods are
reported in Table 4. For the pre—79 period there is virtually no evidence of
announcement effects, regardless of either classification or the
classification method. When (2a) is estimated, only four of the response
coefficients are significant at the ten percent level and one at the five
percent level. Of the three significant coefficients on IRDNT, only one has
the theoretically expected positive sign. Using the FRA method, in only two
instances is or significant and the coefficient associated with
nontechnicalchanges has the wrong sign. As expected, discount rate changes,
regardless of whether or not they are anticipated, do not affect market rates
under interest rate targeting (pre—79).
A different picture emerges from the post—79 period. The of virtually
every equation is higher than that reported in Table 2, indicating that
aitionl information is provided when discountrate changes are separated
intotechnical andnontechnical changes.14 For six of the eight interest
ratesthe market response coefficient to nontechnical discount rate changes is
positive and significant at the five percent level.In no case is the
responsecoefficient positive and significant at even the ten percent level
for technical changes. For equity returns, there is a negative and
significant effect of nontechnical changes, but no significant stock market
reactionto technical changes. These statements are accurate for both
classification methods. Not surprisingly, for the seven significant response
coefficients, both and 'arelarger (in absolute value) than the
response coefficients reported in Table 2. While the results reported in
Table 2 mirror Roley and Troll and Pearce and Roley in implying a 100 basis
point increase in the discount rate results in a 50 basis point increase in
R90 and a one percent decline in stock prices, we find that nontechnical14
increases of identical magnitude increase 'o by 70 basis pointsand reduce
stock prices by 1.6 percent.
These results provide strong support for the hypothesis thatthe market
responds differently to discount rate changes depending onwhether they are
viewed as technical or nontechnical. That is, there is a significant
announcement effect associated with discount rate changes that providethe
market withnewinformation, while there is no discernible announcement effect
associated with technical discount rate changes. This findingis consistent
with and supportstheexistence of the semistrong form of market efficiency.
Theresultsprovide an explanation of the apparent anomalous findingof
an endogenous discount rate coexisting with announcementeffects. Technical
discount rate changes are, by definition, endogenous. Nontechnicaldiscount
rate changes actually consist of both technical and nontechnicalelements.
ccrdir;ly, it is not surprising that discount rate chan'es as awhole fail
tests of statistical exogeneity. On the other hand, theannouncement effect
reported here and in previous studies for the post—79 periodfor discount rate
changes as a whole seems to be due to inappropriately treatingall discount
rate changes the same. Specifically, the results of this paper suggestthat
the observed announcement effect is due only to nontechnical elementswhile
the technical elements do not generate a market reaction. The discount rate
endogeneity—announceiflent effect anomaly is not an anomaly at alland is simply
due to a misspecification.15
Finally, the strength of these results is also reflected inthe
consistencyofthe findings across discount rate change classification
methods.In addition to yielding virtually identical qualitative results,the
coefficients andare similarfor every asset price and in no case can
the null of equal coefficients be rejected. Despite the similarity, however,15
it is of interest to see whether one model dominates the other. A cursory
examination suggests the FRAclassificationmethod is superior to the
statistical classification method since, as measured by the R2, the former
explains a higher variation of movements in asset price in all cases but one.
To formally compare model structure, we employ the pairwise test of
alternative hypotheses suggested by Davidson andMacKinnon(1981) and utilized
by Urich andWachtel(1984) to compare expectations models of money supply
announcements. This test asserts that if there are twomodelspecifications
given by y =f(.)and y =g(.),then the null hypothesis that thefirst




is the predicted value from y =g(,).If the first specification
f(.) is true (rolative to tho ltti:: g(fl, thanwill not e
significantly different from zero. Of course, both models can be accepted as
"true," just as each model can add explanatory power to the other and hence be
said to dominate the other.
The t—statistics for the pairwise specification tests are given in the
last two rows of Table 4, with the model for the null hypothesis listed at the
left.These test statistics indicate that with oneexception neither model
can be said to dominatethe other. Itshould be noted, however, that in all
but one case the test statistic is higher when predictions from the FRA are
added to thestatisticalmodel than vice—versa. Weviewthis as additional
weakevidenceinfavorof theFRA method.
V. Speedof Asset Price Adjustment
As previously noted, an efficientmarket adjustment implies that there
shouldbe no response of asset pricestodiscount rate changes in the post—16
announcement period. We define the post—announcement period as the five
trading days immediately following the announcement day t, i.e., dayst+1 to
t+5. These five days correspond to the first trading week after the discount
rate change announcement. Equations (2) were then reestimated using five
alternative dependent variables to reflect asset price changes on days t+1
through t+5. Accordingly, is defined as the percentage change in the
relevant interest rate or stock prices observed on the thdayafter a
discountrate change and is measured from the close of day t+j—1 to the close
of t+j. Based on the comparison of model structure reported above, we
describe and report the results only for the FRA method, while noting that the
statistical method yielded virtually identical results for each method.
Given the findings reported in Table 4, our primary concern and interest
is with nontechnical changes occuring in the post-79 period. The results from
theother three classificationscanbe easilycumrizcd'nd hence not
reported in a table. Of the 45 response coefficients estimated eachfor
technical changes in the pre— and post79 period, only one is significant at
the five percent leveL. For pre—79 nontechnical changes, only 4 of the 45
response coefficients are significant at the five percentlevel and one of
these has the wrong sign. For each asset and classification, F—statistics
based on the null hypothesis that the sumofthe response coefficients over
the post announcement period equals zero were calculated. In no case could
thisnull hypothesis berejected at even the tenpercent level.
In Table 5 we report theresponse coefficients andF-statistics for the
classification of primaryinterest, nontechnical post—79 discount rate
changes.For the day following the announcement, four of the interest rate
and the stock price coefficients are significant ata minimum of the ten
percentlevel.16 This day t+1 price response was also found by Pearce and17
Roley for stock price adjustment to discount rate changes. For days t+2
through t+5, only 3 of a possible 40 response coefficients are significant at
the five percent level, and one of these has the wrong sign. Because of the
number of coefficients estimated over the post—announcement period, the
statistical significance of any small set of coefficients should be
interpreted cautiously. In particular, the number of statistically
significant coefficients we found for days t+2 to t÷5 would be expected even
if no actual relationship exists. A more convincing test of slow price
adjustmentis theF—statistic based on the null hypothesis that the response
coefficientsoverthe post—announcement period sunt to zero. These test
statisticsfor nontechnical post—79 changes are reported in the last row of
Table 5.In nocase can thenullof no asset price reaction berejectedat
thefive percent level. Overall, the empirical results described above and
reportedin Table5 provide strongsupportfor therapid pricedjutmnt
associatedwith market efficiency and indicate that, to the extent markets
reactto discount rate changes, the reaction islargelycomplete by theendof
the announcement day and certainly complete by the end of day t+1.
VI. Conclusions
The purpose of this paper has been to reconcile previous findings of both
anendogenousdiscount rate and discount rate announcement effects with market
efficiency. Byclassifyingdiscount rate changes as either technical or
nontechnical,and recognizing that the latter are (at least) partially
endogenous, it is argued that the discount rate can fail tests of statistical
exogeneity and still exhibit announcement effects within the framework of
market efficiency. To be valid, however, only nontechnical discount rate
changes should exhibit announcement effects.17 Combined with the evidence
that the potential for announcement effects associated with discount rate18
changes depends on the monetary policy regime, the implication is that only
nontechnical post—79 discount rate changes should yield announcement
effects. The empirical evidence of this paper supports this view and suggests
previous studies were misspecified by not controlling for the purpose of the
discount rate change.
The evidence also implies that the common assumption, contained in
virtually all theoretical and empirical macroeconomic models, that the
discount rate is either purely endogenous or purely exogenous, is
inappropriate. in addition, our findings may have some bearing on the
continuing debate over the usefulness of the discount rate as a tool for
macroeconomic policy. One argument against its use has been that it can
generate perverse announcement effects because the public, as Waud (1970, p.
250) states, reads "broader economic implications into even 'routine technical
.nnnt'"Thevidence hereindicatesthat this is not the se
Markets react only when there appears to be a shift in policy-—which is when a
marketreaction is desirable——and not to technical adjustments in the discount
rate. At least from thisstandpoint, one cannot rule out the discount rate as
auseful tool of monetary policy.
Finally,our results support the existence of efficient markets basedon
thedual finding that only nontechnical changes are characterized by
announcement effects and that virtually the entire market adjustment occurs by
the end of theannouncement day.TABLE 1
The Size of Discount Rate Changes, Pre-79 arid Post-79
Discount Rate
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Announcement Day Response Coefficients for
Technical and Nontechnical Changes, Pre—79 and
Pre —79
Statistic A90 90r90 190r180 1r2 3r2 5r2 7r3 10r10 SP
—1.29 —.251 .748 1.01 1.48* .808 .543 .095 —11.3
t(8.r) (1.71) (.27) (1 .12) (1.27) (1.90) (1.69) (1.12) (.35) (1 .48)
.304* .218 .076 —.137 _.366** —.111 _.174* —.007 1.81
t() (2.11) (1.26) (.60) (.90) (2.46) (1.37)(1.90) —(.13) (1.24)
A2 .230 .167 .328 .100 .288 .189 .211 .011 .128
—.061 .184 .291** .175 —.022 .079 .008 —.011 —.705
t(6T) (.45) (1.22)(2.67)(1.31) (.15) (1.02) (.10) (.24) (.51)
.152 .134 .109 —.053 .150 —.014 _.116* .016 .316
t(8wr) (1 .58) (1.20)(1.39) (.55) (1.41)(.26) (1.97) (.51) ( .31)
A2 .155 .161 .373 .122 .118 .070 .208 .021 .024
Post-79
.430 .203 —.210 —.056 .003 —.006 —.461 -.137 2.68
t(6T) (.50) (.24) (.27) (.15) (.01) (.02)(_1.77)*(.43) (.87)
.615** .498** .587** .201** .189** .098 .076 .178** —1 •55*
tCBNT) (3.00)(2.44) (3.17) (2.22) (2.17)(1.24) (1.21)(2.34) (2.09)
A2 .561 .437 .506 .340 .340 .146 .178 .332 .242
.127 .247 .266 .003 .084 .050 —.032 .136 —.021
t(8T) (.87) (1.05) (.02) (.71) (.61) (.37) (1.32) (.02)
.719** .550** .645** .214** .260** .110 .092 .209** _1.60**
t(.1.) (3.84) (2.66) (3.47) (2.42) (3.01) (.98) (1.44) (2.79) (2.22)
A2 .661 .463 .541 .418 .427 .158 .322 .407 .265
Tets of CLassification Method
lf: tattqtiraI 2.04* .81 .07 1.34 .')*l .S4 .14 .73 .133
VI3A —.55 —.02 •5(1 .07 •04 •44 I•41 • 00 •113
aN=18for both pre—79 and post-79 periodn. fj4; .i(- thliv,f$.r..,iI I,,vI





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1Forother studies that have reported significant announcementeffects of
discount rate changes on a variety of securities markets, seeBaker and Meyer
(1980), and Brown (1981), as well as those discussedin the text.
2For a discussion of market efficiency and a review of some relevant
literature, see Fama (1970) and Copeland and Wes ton (1979).
3This is a much stronger statement than is actually necessary.
Specifically, although a technical change in thediscount rate may beknown
withcertainty, its timing may not. Since discount rate changeshavereal
effects, this timing uncertainty may give rise to anannouncement effect in
some markets even for endogenous discount rate changes.If timing uncertainty
is at least as great for nontechnical changes as it is fortechnical changes,
market efficiency would lead us to assert that the announcementeffect of a
nontechnicalchange exceeds that associated with a technical change.Our
discussionin the text, which can be viewed as assuming no timing uncertainty,
is one example of this assertion and, given the empirical findings,simplifies
the exposition of the paper. it is important, however, to be awareof the
timing issue and to recognize that an announcement effectassociated with
discount rate changes is appropriately viewed as a necessarybut not
sufficient condition to assert that the market is inefficient.
41n principle, one could separate out the numerator and denominator
effects of discount rate changes on stock prices. Such an analysis,however,
involves rather heroic assumptions and would be, at most, of tangential
relevance to our research.
forward rate r is obtained by the formula r ((x +y)/y)R
-
xv xy x+y
(x/y)R where R is the actual cash market rate on a bond.An alternative
approxmatiOfl to calculating forward rates is presented by Shiller, Campbell
and Schoenholtz (1983) was shown by Roley and Troll to makelittle difference.
61n the post—79 period there was either an imposition of or an increase
in a surcharge on discount window borrowing on the same announcement dayas
three discount rate changes. To control for this, the estimationof all
equations over the post—79 period includes a dummyvariable equal to one when
the surcharge change is announcedon thesame day as a discount rate change
and is zero otherwise. Exclusion of this variable does not change our
results.
7me two ratesthat do not indicate a response to discount rate changes
correspondto the intermediate forward rate 5r5 used by Roley andTroll. This
isalsothe rate they reported as not being significantly affected bydiscount
rate changes.
8The results in Table 2 indicate clearly that the size of the discount
rate change is an important determinant of asset price reaction.To examine
this finding further, we tested whether only the announcement of adiscount
rate change, regardless of magnitude, explains asset price reaction.This was
done via estimation of the equation.20
= CHANGE+RD+c it Ct tt
whereCHANGE equals +1 if the discount rate increased, -1 if the discount rate
decreased, and zero otherwise. If only the announcement matters, we expect
a > 0(<0) and 8= 0for interest rates (stock prices). Otherwise we
epect C=0and 8tobe as discussed in the text. In all cases, was not
significaCntly different from zero and 8wassimilar in magnitude and
significance to the results reported in Table 2. This finding provides
further support for the specification given in equation (1).
9Roley and Troll find that only when the fed funds rate increases by at
least 100 basis points is there a significant relationship between changes in
the fed funds rate and changes in the discount rate. Further, negative
movements in the fed funds rate do not indicate any significant relationship
between changes in the fed funds rate and changes in the discount rate.
10We used the Federal Reserve press release to classify this
controversial discount rate change, which occurred on February 5, 1975.
Classification according to the Wall Street Journal's interpretation made
virtually no difference in the results.
There are, however, at least two difficulties that are more severe for
the statistical method. In some sense, every week where a discount rate
change is not made has a "non—announcement" effect that could effect security
prices. This difficulty, of course, will characterize any study of
announcement effects when the timing of the announcement is not a priori
known.Additionl1y, discount rctcchanges have been 25. 50 or 100 basis
points, but predictions of the statisticalmodel maybe any amount, so that
some predictions of discount rate changes (e.g., 11 basis points) may be
unrealistic. It may be more appropriate, then, to view the statisticalmethod
asreflecting the probability of a discount rate change multiplied by the size
of the expected change. This suggests possibly using a logit model to
estimate probabilities of discount rate changes. Such a model would still be
characterized by the first difficulty and, further, there is no control for
sizeor direction unless even more complexity is added via a multinomial logit
model.
2The correlation between the percentage oftechnicalcomponents and
between nontechnical components across models are equal, and the correlation
betweenthetechnical and nontechnical components of the models equal in
magnitudebut of opposite sign to the like correlations, because using
percentages normalizes all discount rate changes to be the same size and the
two classifications must sum to one.
This, of course, does not hold if magnitudes are used instead of
percentages. The former are sensitive to the absolute size of discount rate
change. Since it islikely that bothtechnicaland nontechnical components
willincrease with the absolute size of a discount rate change, a positive
correlation between the technical and nontechnical classifications of the two
methods could result. Even so, we expect the like classifications of the two
models to be more highly correlated than the opposite classifications. Using
magnitudes, the correlation between technical (nontechnical) classifications
of the two models is .70 (.86), while the correlation between technical
(nontechnical)classifications from thestatistical method and nontechnical21
(technical) classification from the FRA method is .50 (.57). This finding
further reflects the consistency of the twomodels.
13The data on technical and nontechnical discount rate changes is
available from the authors upon request.
14The only case where a significant increase (at the five percent level)
in explanatory power is not observed using the FRA method is for the 5r2
forward rate. When the statistical analysis is employed, the explanatory
power of equations using the forward rates 3r2, 7r3 and 10r10 actually
declines.
150neconjectureconsistent with the empirical evidence and perhaps with
future investigation is the notion that all discount rate changes are
technicalin nature but the policy authorities choose the discount rate
announcement as an opportunity to signal changes in the direction and/or
magnitudeof monetary policy. Several readers suggested t'ealternativeview,
consistent with the above conjecture, that while all discount rate changes are
to some extent endogenous, nontechnical changes arise because of changes in or
uncertainty about the policy rule or the Federal Reserve reaction function.
16 of these interest rates, 5r2 and 7r3, evidence no announcement
effect on day t. This finding may be due to relatively thin trading of
instruments in this maturity range so that the effect of discount rate changes
is not fully reflected in prices until after day t. The existence of thin
trading also implies abnormal returns could not be earned basedon a trading
strategyimplemented on day t.
17This assertion assumes no timing uncertainty, otherwise, as previously
noted, an endogenous discount rdte geneating an announcement effect is not
necessarily an indication of market inefficiency.22
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